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Concern for FMD Increases 
As of April 30, 2001, foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD) outbreaks had occurred in the United 
Kingdom (UK), The Netherlands, France, 
Republic of Ireland, Colombia, Argentina, and 
other countries.  FMD also is present in South 
America and in some areas of Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia.  In the UK alone, more 
than 1,500 cases have been confirmed in 
livestock in the recent outbreak.  Fortunately, 
the number of new cases detected has decreased 
to less than 10 per day from more than 40 daily 
in late March, and new cases have not been 
detected for several weeks in some of the 
affected countries.  All wildlife tested in the UK 
so far has been negative for FMD, and wildlife 
has not been depopulated to stop spread of the 
disease.  
The U. S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
has reminded livestock producers and 
veterinarians in the United States to be alert for 
disease conditions suspicious of FMD in 
susceptible animals and to take every precaution 
to promote biosecurity.  APHIS, with assistance 
from SCWDS, has extended this notice to 
wildlife professionals because an FMD outbreak 
in the United States could be devastating to wild 
animals as well as domestic livestock. 
Foot-and-mouth disease is a highly infectious 
viral disease that can severely affect all 
domestic and wild cloven-hoofed animals 
including cattle, swine, sheep, goats, and deer 
and other cervids. FMD virus does not readily 
infect humans.  In affected animals, FMD 
causes blisters (vesicles) in the mouth and on 
the feet and teats, lameness, and excessive 
salivation.  Young animals that are severely 
affected may die; however, chronic non-fatal 
cases are much more common.  FMD can be 
confirmed only by laboratory tests.  
The highly transmissible nature of FMD cannot 
be overemphasized.  Infected animals are the 
source of the virus, but infectious viral particles 
may be carried in the wind or on virtually any 
animate or inanimate object.  Virus may be 
found in aerosols, saliva, feces, urine, milk, 
semen, meat, and meat byproducts of infected 
animals.  To prevent the spread of FMD virus in 
the UK and other parts of Europe, more than 
two million cattle, sheep and swine have been 
slaughtered, animal movement has been banned, 
livestock shows have been cancelled, and 
national parks and public footpaths have been 
closed to eliminate human traffic that may 
spread the virus.  APHIS routinely restricts 
importation of animals and animal products that 
could spread FMD from FMD-infected 
countries, and these restrictions have been 
extended to include the European Union.  
An outbreak of FMD in the United States could 
directly affect wild ruminants and feral swine by 
causing clinical disease or death.  Equally 
significant is the probability that wildlife could 
be heavily impacted by control programs if wild 
animals were confirmed or suspected as 
reservoirs or disseminators of FMD virus.  
Following the 1924 outbreak of FMD in 
California livestock, more than 22,000 deer 
were slaughtered in the effort to eliminate the 
disease because deer with lesions suggestive of 
 




FMD were found.  The response to an outbreak 
of FMD in the United States will be dramatic 
and would be designated as a national 
emergency.  Wildlife-related control measures 
to prevent the spread of FMD could potentially 
include local depopulation of susceptible 
wildlife, closure of hunting seasons in affected 
areas, prohibition of movement of wildlife or 
wildlife products, and restriction of access to 
public and private land in affected areas.  
All wildlife professionals should be alert to the 
current FMD threat and be aware of the 
potential for wildlife involvement if FMD 
spreads to the United States.  Unusual mortality 
of any cloven-hoofed wildlife should be 
reported immediately to the State Veterinarian 
and the APHIS Area-Veterinarian-in-Charge, 
who will assist with the diagnostic investigation.  
(Prepared by Joe Corn and John Fischer) 
 
Keep FMD out of America! 
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is endemic in 
many countries around the world, but new 
outbreaks are occurring in areas that have not 
been affected for decades.  Fortunately, this 
severe disease of cloven-hoofed livestock and 
wildlife has not been present in the United 
States since 1929 because of the constant 
vigilance and strict importation standards set by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). 
Due to the recent outbreak in the United 
Kingdom and other countries, APHIS has 
expanded to keep FMD from entering the 
United States.  The following new regulations 
were implemented: 
· Temporary prohibition of importation of all 
swine and ruminants and their by-products 
from the European Union. 
· Importation of used farm equipment is 
temporarily banned from all areas under 
FMD import restrictions. 
In addition to the emergency measures, APHIS 
also has increased action in several other areas 
to help ensure that FMD does not gain entry into 
our borders. 
· APHIS has dispatched teams of 
veterinarians and other animal health 
personnel to assist the United Kingdom in 
bringing the current epidemic under control. 
· More than 450 specially trained 
veterinarians, including APHIS employees, 
military personnel, and state and federal 
employees, are working with state and local 
agriculture officials to investigate any 
reports of possible FMD occurring in the 
United States. 
· The APHIS Emergency Management 
Operations Center (EMOC) has been 
activated to answer technical and consumer/ 
traveler questions regarding FMD (technical 
questions 1-800-601-9327, consumer/ 
traveler hotline 1-866-723-4827). APHIS 
also has information available on an 
improved web site (www.aphis.usda.gov). 
· Increased numbers of APHIS inspectors are 
posted at America’s borders, airports, and 
ports to watch for illegal entry of animals 
and animal by-products that might harbor 
the FMD virus. 
· APHIS has emergency operations plans in 
place to respond to the potential spread of 
FMD to the United States. 
APHIS asks that everyone help prevent the 
spread of FMD to the United States by 
practicing the following basic preventive 
measures that have always been in effect. 
· Travelers entering the United States from all 
countries must declare all visits to farms or 
livestock facilities on their U.S. Customs 
Declaration Form. 
· International travelers must report food 
items and other material of plant or animal 
origin in their possession upon entering the 
 




U.S.  Mailing animal products from 
countries under import restrictions is illegal. 
· Travelers should avoid farms, sale barns, 
laboratories where animals are housed, 
packing houses, zoos, and fairs for five days 
prior to returning from an affected country. 
· All travelers from FMD-affected countries 
must avoid contact with livestock and 
wildlife for five days after returning to the 
United States. 
· Travelers should clean their clothes, shoes, 
luggage, and other personal belongings 
before returning to the United States or as 
soon thereafter as possible. 
· Persons transporting dogs and cats from an 
affected country into the United States 
should rid the animal of excess dirt and 
make sure that bedding material is free of 
straw, hay, or other natural bedding 
materials that might harbor the virus.  As 
with people returning to the United States, it 
is advisable to keep pets separate from 
livestock for five days after returning as well 
as bathe them as soon as they are back in the 
United States. 
If all of the recommended procedures are 
observed, the chance of the FMD virus entering 
the U.S. remains small.  However, it is 
extremely important for everyone to follow 
APHIS’ travel and importation guidelines in 
order to prevent FMD from entering the United 




APHIS Policies for Wildlife in an 
FMD Emergency 
On April 20, 2001, the International Association 
of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (IAFWA) hosted 
a meeting to discuss wildlife issues regarding 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and to maintain 
open communication between animal health and 
wildlife management agencies.  The meeting 
was attended by individuals representing state 
and federal wildlife management and animal 
health agencies, SCWDS, and wildlife-oriented 
non-governmental organizations. 
Dr. Alfonso Torres, Deputy Administrator for 
Veterinary Services, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (APHIS), discussed APHIS 
policies regarding wildlife in a potential FMD 
emergency.  APHIS believes that FMD most 
likely would be self-limiting in wildlife in the 
long term.  The most efficient method of 
controlling FMD will be immediate removal of 
infected and exposed domestic animals to 
prevent transmission of FMD to other livestock 
or wildlife.  Dr. Torres stated that APHIS does 
not have plans to systematically kill or 
depopulate wildlife to control FMD.  However, 
in the short term preventing transmission of 
FMD between domestic and wild animals will 
be critical.  Immediate surveillance of 
susceptible free-ranging species, primarily wild 
ruminants and feral swine, potentially exposed 
to infected livestock is warranted to determine 
whether FMD has spread to wildlife.  This will 
entail lethal collection of these species for 
diagnostic testing.  Additionally, local 
reduction of the density of susceptible wildlife 
populations in an infected zone would be 
employed to prevent the spread of FMD if 
wildlife were identified as a risk factor.  Long-
term observation in the area also is warranted 
to ascertain that FMD has not become 
established in wildlife.  Involvement of the 
state and other appropriate wildlife 
management agencies is essential in planning 
and implementing wildlife-related work in an 
emergency response. These policies and 
procedures may change as additional 
information becomes available through 
research or while monitoring an outbreak. 
The need to develop additional information 
regarding FMD in wild species was identified. 
Funds are being sought for experiments to 
evaluate clinical disease and viral shedding in 
native North American species, such as bison 
and pronghorn.  Additional research projects 
 




are needed to assess the potential for non-
susceptible wild species, such as birds, to serve 
as mechanical carriers of FMD virus. 
Dr. Torres also discussed the concept of 
"compartmentalization" of animal diseases 
with respect to international trade.  In short, the 
presence of a particular disease in free-ranging 
wildlife may not affect the "disease free" status 
of a country providing there is no apparent 
transmission of the disease to domestic 
livestock.  The implication of this policy is that 
there would be no economic-based pressures to 
depopulate wild animals to control a disease 
that is not affecting domestic animals, provided 
that disease transmission between wild and 
domestic animals is mitigated.  Regardless, the 
ultimate goal will be eradication of the disease 
from all animals within the country, whether 
domestic or wild. 
The recent meeting reaffirmed the network that 
exists between animal health and wildlife 
resource agencies.  For decades, state and 
federal wildlife management agencies have 
worked with APHIS to protect the health of 
wild and domestic animals.  In the early 1980s, 
Memoranda of Understanding were signed 
between APHIS and the wildlife management 
agencies of all 50 states, as well as the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, to formally 
acknowledge the cooperative effort required to 
eradicate or control certain animal diseases.  
There is open communication between APHIS 
and wildlife agencies through the Fish and 
Wildlife Health Task Force of the IAFWA, as 
well as through a Cooperative Agreement 
between APHIS and SCWDS.  Under this 
Agreement, SCWDS serves as liaison between 
animal health and wildlife agencies to provide 
information, training, and recommendations to 
prevent or control animal diseases via a 
network of wildlife liaisons representing 52 
state and territorial wildlife agencies.  
Veterinary Services, through SCWDS, 
currently is developing additional guidelines 
for wildlife aspects of the emergency response 
to a highly contagious animal disease.  These 
guidelines will be added to a revised document 
originally made available on March 30, 2001, 
and will be disseminated to all state wildlife 
resource agencies.  The original guidelines and 
other information regarding FMD are available 
at the APHIS web site (www.aphis.usda.gov).  
(Prepared by John Fischer) 
 
What if FMD Hits? 
While every effort is being made to keep foot-
and-mouth disease (FMD) out of the United 
States, state and federal agencies are continuing 
to prepare for the worst.  In the event that an 
FMD outbreak does occur, state and federal 
agencies will implement their emergency 
response plans in order to contain and then 
eradicate the disease. This emergency response 
plan will entail a huge cooperative effort 
involving many areas of expertise, including 
diagnosis and surveillance, quarantine and 
biosecurity, epidemiology, depopulation and 
disposal, cleaning and disinfecting, and public 
information.  The following is an abbreviated 
summary of guidelines for fish and wildlife 
agencies if FMD occurs in the United States.  
SCWDS developed these guidelines in 
cooperation with Emergency Programs, 
Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department 
of Agriculture.  Since 1979, SCWDS has 
conducted surveillance and training programs 
regarding the wildlife aspects of foreign animal 
diseases (FAD), and has participated in the 
response to FAD introductions into the United 
States under a Cooperative Agreement with 
APHIS. 
If FMD is confirmed in the United States, the 
affected state(s) will initiate immediate 
measures in response to the outbreak.  In 
addition, a declaration of an emergency by the 
Secretary of Agriculture would activate the 
Regional Emergency Animal Disease 
Eradication Organization (READEO).  The 
READEO will provide technical support for the 
state emergency response system.  The 
READEO is comprised of state and federal 
 




personnel who have been trained to perform 
pre-assigned tasks and are prepared to mobilize 
immediately.  This response includes a 
READEO Wildlife Section. The Wildlife 
Section will be led by a USDA-appointed 
Wildlife Officer and a State Wildlife Liaison 
Officer (SWLO).  The goal of the Wildlife 
Section is to protect both domestic animals and 
wildlife through prompt disease eradication.  A 
SWLO has been appointed to the READEO by 
each of the 52 state and territorial Fish and 
Wildlife Agencies. 
Objectives of the Wildlife Section include 
determining the risk for wildlife to maintain or 
disseminate FMD and the reduction or 
elimination of such risk.  This risk will be 
dependent upon the distribution, density, and 
biology of wildlife species present, the level of 
exposure of susceptible wildlife to infected 
domestic animals, and the environmental 
conditions in the area.  It will be critical to 
rapidly assemble all current information 
regarding wildlife in the affected area.  
Depending on the species present and their 
potential exposure to FMD, the Wildlife Section 
will determine if surveillance is necessary. 
Surveillance of wildlife for FMD in the vicinity 
of an infected premise will be based on the 
prevailing local circumstances.  Surveillance 
will include FMD-susceptible species to 
determine if wildlife at a premise is infected and 
if the virus is spreading away from the premise. 
Surveillance also may be conducted on non-
susceptible species such as birds to evaluate 
their potential role as mechanical carriers of 
virus.  Because FMD is highly infectious, all 
persons participating in Wildlife Section 
activities must officially be part of the Task 
Force and will work under strict biosecurity 
guidelines.  In addition, surveillance and disease 
control programs must be conducted within 
federal, state, and local laws.  
If wildlife is considered a risk factor for FMD 
dissemination in the outbreak, programs will be 
initiated immediately to prevent contact 
between infected livestock, wildlife, and 
uninfected domestic animals.  Containment of 
free-ranging wildlife to prevent the spread of 
disease is extremely difficult.  It may be deemed 
necessary to reduce local wildlife populations to 
a density at which FMD transmission is 
unlikely.  This would require immediate and 
aggressive actions that will adversely affect 
local wildlife.  However, the short-term and 
localized impact must be weighed against the 
long-term and widespread consequences of 
allowing FMD to persist in wildlife, including 
the potential for considerable wildlife mortality 
from FMD. 
As has been seen in the United Kingdom, 
control and eradication of FMD can affect 
public access to affected areas.  The Wildlife 
Section will identify hunting seasons and 
wildlife-associated activities occurring within 
affected areas.  This information will be used to 
provide recommendations for hunting season 
closures, as well as restrictions to public land 
access, in order to halt the spread of FMD.  It is 
highly probable that private landowners with 
animals at risk also will close their property.  
Public support for these and other eradication 
activities will be essential for success.   
State Fish and Wildlife Agency personnel 
currently are participating in state emergency 
planning activities.  SWLOs are ascertaining 
immediate availability of wildlife distribution 
and density information, scientific collecting 
permits, personnel, and equipment to conduct 
the above-listed activities.  For additional 
information please contact SCWDS at 706-542-
1741 or APHIS at 1-800-601-9327 or see the 
APHIS web site at www.aphis.usda.gov.  
(Prepared by Joe Corn and John Fischer) 
 
No Time for Complacency! 
“If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and 
quacks like a duck…it must be a duck!” This 
old adage can be useful in many situations 
where the odds strongly favor the probability 
that what is seen truly is a “duck.”  But, there is 
 




another adage that declares, “Assumption is the 
mother of all foul-ups!”  Not all things are what 
they seem, and the similarity between foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) and hemorrhagic disease 
(HD) in white-tailed deer is a good example. 
The Annual SCWDS Hemorrhagic Disease 
Surveillance Questionnaire has revealed that 
HD has occurred in free-ranging deer in 
multiple states every year since the survey 
began in 1980.  Thus, the odds strongly favor 
that we will see HD again somewhere in 2001.  
Most readers are familiar with HD, and many 
can rapidly recall animals they have seen or the 
photographs of HD lesions shown in SCWDS’s 
Field Manual of Wildlife Diseases in the 
Southeastern United States or the SCWDS HD 
brochure.  But there is a hazard to this 
familiarity:  experimental FMD infections in 
white-tailed deer caused oral, foot, heart, and 
rumen lesions that are visually indistinguishable 
from HD lesions! 
The scale of the FMD outbreak in Europe and 
its presence on other continents has heightened 
public awareness of the risk that FMD 
represents to the United States.  Should FMD 
enter the United States, we do not know how it 
will behave in our wildlife populations, 
although all cloven-hoofed animals must be 
considered vulnerable.  We know that white-
tailed deer are fully susceptible to FMD, based 
on a small experimental trial; we also know that 
black-tailed deer likely were involved in the 
1924 FMD outbreak in California.  The 
California episode was disturbing because the 
lesions were not discovered in deer until the 
outbreak in cattle was 145 days old!  Can we 
afford to learn that we have FMD in wildlife 
after we have been fighting the disease for 
almost five months? 
It is unlikely that the first case of FMD seen in 
the United States will be in a wild ungulate.  But 
if it is, the sick wild animal probably will not 
exhibit the classical vesicular lesions (blisters) 
of FMD that occur on the mouth and feet.   
These vesicles are fragile and transient, and it is 
more likely that the affected deer, elk, 
pronghorn, or other animal will have progressed 
beyond the vesicular stage to having erosions, 
which will mimic HD!  For this reason, wildlife 
managers must make the extra effort to get 
professional diagnostic assistance on suspected 
cases of HD during the upcoming year.  
Assistance can be obtained by contacting 
SCWDS, your State Veterinarian’s office, State 
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, or APHIS’ 
Area-Veterinarian-in-Charge for your state.  
(Prepared by Vic Nettles) 
 
VS Persistence on Ossabaw Island 
Georgia’s Ossabaw Island has the distinction of 
being the only confirmed enzoootic focus of the 
New Jersey serotype of vesicular stomatitis 
virus (VSV-NJ) in the United States, and the 
barrier island has served as an outdoor 
laboratory for research on the epidemiology of 
VSV-NJ since the early 1980s.   VSV-NJ 
activity on Ossabaw Island initially was 
detected in the 1960s by serologic testing of 
feral swine and white-tailed deer.  But it was not 
until 1983 that the virus was isolated from a 
feral pig with vesicular lesions.  From then 
through the early 1990s, VSV-NJ was isolated 
on several occasions from the sand fly vector 
(Lutzomyia shannoni) and from additional feral 
swine, with and without clinical disease. 
White-tailed deer (WTD) represent the only 
species at this site that have been under 
continued surveillance since 1981.  WTD have 
proven to be a reliable indicator of VSV-NJ 
activity, despite the fact that naturally occurring 
vesicular stomatitis has never been observed in 
WTD, and there have been no isolations of 
VSV-NJ from free-ranging WTD.  From 1981 
through 2000, SCWDS has tested blood samples 
from more than 1,800 hunter-killed WTD as 
shown on the Figure below, and seropositive 
deer have been detected every year. 
 
 




Antibodies to VSV-NJ in white-tailed deer 
Ossabaw Island, GA 1981-2000















The prevalence of antibodies to VSV-NJ 
appears to be decreasing, but it is possible that 
this represents variations in sampling rather than 
an actual decrease in activity.  For example, it is 
known that VSV-NJ is associated with the old-
growth maritime forest on Ossabaw Island, and 
since 1981 the area under surveillance has been 
enlarged to include less favorable VSV-NJ 
habitats due to expansion of the public deer 
hunting zone. 
These data indicate that VSV-NJ is alive and 
well on Ossabaw Island, and its continual 
detection solely through wildlife surveillance 
has important implications to developing 
integrated animal disease detection systems. 
SCWDS work on Ossabaw Island clearly 
demonstrates that important livestock 
pathogens, such as VSV-NJ, can persist in the 
absence of domestic animal hosts and, that in 
such areas, detection of the virus would escape 
conventional surveillance systems based on 
domestic animal species alone. This focus of 
VSV-NJ infection would still be unknown if 
active surveillance directed at wildlife had not 
taken place.  This observation could have 
relevance to other diseases of domestic animal.  




More TB in Michigan 
The number of counties and wildlife species in 
which bovine tuberculosis (TB) has been found 
continues to increase in Michigan.  Bovine TB 
has been recognized as endemic in free-ranging 
white-tailed deer in the state’s northeastern 
lower peninsula since 1994.  Surveillance of 
hunter-killed deer in 2000 detected an infected 
white-tailed deer in Emmet County for the first 
time, and the number of Michigan counties in 
which deer with TB have been found now 
stands at 12.  Bovine TB also was confirmed for 
the first time in a hunter-killed wild elk in 
Michigan in 2000. Surveillance of other 
Michigan wildlife has detected bovine TB in 13 
coyotes, 4 black bears, 4 bobcats, 2 raccoons, 2 
opossums, and 2 red foxes. 
Surveillance of Michigan wildlife for bovine TB 
continues.  To date, more than 64,000 wild 
white-tailed deer have been examined and 340 
positive animals have been found.  Nearly all of 
these animals were submitted as part of a 
voluntary program in which heads from hunter-
killed deer were examined by personnel from 
the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 
Michigan State University, and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.  More than 800 
hunter-killed elk and numerous wild carnivores 
and omnivores also have been examined. 
Continued surveillance of domestic livestock in 
Michigan recently detected bovine TB in three 
beef cattle herds in Alpena County and one in 
Alcona County.  These are two of four counties, 
parts of which make up the “high risk area” 
where bovine TB has been found in livestock. 
This makes a total of 2 dairy herds and 14 beef 
herds to test positive as of May 14, 2001.  
Owners are given the choice of depopulating 
each entire herd or becoming involved in a test-
and-remove program.  The Michigan Depart-
ment of Agriculture has conducted more than 
600,000 individual animal tests for TB in cattle, 
goats, bison, and privately owned cervids.  
(Prepared by John Fischer) 
 
 




CWD in Saskatchewan Mule Deer 
Chronic wasting disease (CWD), a transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathy of deer and elk, 
recently was diagnosed in a two-year-old 
hunter-harvested mule deer in western 
Saskatchewan, Canada.  Prior to this, CWD had 
been detected only in free-ranging cervids from 
an endemic focus in adjoining areas of 
northeastern Colorado, southeastern Wyoming, 
and western Nebraska (see SCWDS BRIEFS 
Vol. 16, No. 4).  In 1997, the disease also was 
detected in captive elk in South Dakota.  
Subsequently, CWD-positive captive elk herds 
have been identified in four additional states 
(CO, MT, NE, and OK) and Saskatchewan, 
Canada. 
Last fall, Saskatchewan Environment Resource 
Management personnel collected brain samples 
from approximately 1,400 free-ranging elk and 
deer for CWD testing.  The positive mule deer is 
the only wild cervid in Canada in which CWD 
has been detected. Test results are pending for 
other deer harvested in the area in which the 
positive mule deer was taken.  Additional work 
will be necessary to determine if the positive 
mule deer represents a new endemic focus of 
CWD in free-ranging cervids or spillover from 
disease in CWD-positive farmed elk.  (Prepared 
by Joe Gaydos) 
HD 2000 
 
Reports for the 2000 Hemorrhagic Disease (HD) 
Surveillance Questionnaire have been received 
from 39 states, and a Preliminary Report has 
been issued to all contact persons for final 
verification.  Activity that fits at least one of the 
four HD criteria (late summer/ early fall death 
losses, compatible necropsy findings, isolation 
of an HD virus, or chronic HD lesions in hunter-
killed deer) has been reported by 21 states.  HD 
death losses that were confirmed by virus 
isolation and/or polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) tests occurred in 11 states (AR, CA, GA, 
ID, KS, MD, NE, NC, SC, TX, VA).  Epizootic 
hemorrhagic disease virus serotype 2 (EHDV-2) 
was the most common virus isolated. EHDV-1 
was isolated in California, and both EHDV-1 
and EHDV-2 were found in Texas.  North 
Carolina had one deer infected with both 
EHDV-2 and bluetongue virus serotype 13.  In 
addition, California had a small episode of the 
unrelated deer adenovirus infection in one 
county.  Notable mortality was reported in CA, 
GA, ID, KS, KY, MD, MT, NE, NC, ND, and 
SC.  A final report will be prepared after the 
comments are received from the participating 
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